Assigned for all purposes to: Stanley Mosk Courthouse, Judicial Officer: James Chalfant

Dan L. Longo (SBN 105988) Suzanna R. Harman (SBN 300669) MURCHISON & CUMMING, LLP 2 801 South Grand Avenue, Ninth Floor Los Angeles, California 90017-4613 Telephone: (213) 623-7400 Facsimile: (213) 623-6336 dlongo@murchisonlaw.com E-Mail 5 sharman@murchisonlaw.com Attorneys for Petitioner, Samuel A. Perroni 6 7 SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA 8 9 COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES, CENTRAL DISTRICT 10 11 SAMUEL A. PERRONI, CASE NO. 21STCP00108 12 Petitioner. **COMPLAINT FOR:** 13 VS. 1. **VERIFIED PETITION FOR WRIT OF** MANDATE; 14 ALEX VILLANUEVA, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS SHERIFF: THE COUNTY 2. DECLARATORY RELIEF; AND 15 OF LOS ANGELES SHERIFF'S DEPARTMENT; and DOES 3. INJUNCTIVE RELIEF 16 1 through 50, Inclusive, 17 Respondents. 18 19 COMES NOW, Petitioner, SAMUEL A. PERRONI, who for causes of action against 20 the Respondents, and each of them, including DOES 1 through 50, Inclusive, complain 21 and allege as follows: 22 INTRODUCTION 23 This is a lawsuit to enforce the right to inspect public records pursuant to Article I, § 24 3, of the California Constitution and the California Public Records Act (hereinafter the 25 "CPRA"), Cal. Gov't Code § 6250 et seq. Petitioner, SAMUEL A. PERRONI (hereinafter 26 "Petitioner" or "Mr. Perroni") a book author and retired federal prosecutor and criminal-27 defense attorney, requested in writing records from Respondent, THE COUNTY OF LOS 28

ANGELES SHERIFF'S DEPARTMENT (hereinafter "Respondent Sheriff's Department") and its sheriff Respondent, ALEX VILLANUEVA (hereinafter "Respondent Villanueva"). Petitioner is writing a book on a matter of significant public interest, the November 1981 death of actress Natalie Wagner, a/k/a Natalie Wood. Petitioner requested records from Respondents regarding Respondent Sheriff's Department's involvement in the investigation of Ms. Wood's death. Through his work, Petitioner seeks to inform the public about the circumstances of Ms. Wood's death. Regrettably, Respondents have met Petitioner's requests for records with obstruction and delay. Respondents continue without lawful justification to withhold records that are subject to timely production under the CPRA. Consequently, Petitioner seeks the Court's intervention and an award of attorneys' fees and costs.

THE PARTIES

- 1. Petitioner Mr. Perroni is an author and a retired Arkansas trial lawyer.

 Among other things, at all times relevant to this complaint and petition, Petitioner has been engaged in the gathering and researching of public records, including information from state and local California government agencies and departments, concerning the death of Ms. Wood.
- 2. Respondent Sheriff's Department is the sheriff's department for Los Angeles County, California, providing patrol services, courthouse security, housing and transportation of inmates within the county jail system, and various other services such as crime laboratories and homicide investigations. Respondent Sheriff's Department maintains or controls the relevant records at issue in this lawsuit because it conducted a homicide investigation into the 1981 death of Natalie Wagner a/k/a Natalie Wood. Respondent Sheriff's Department is the legal custodian of the records at issue in this lawsuit. Respondent Sheriff's Department maintains its primary place of business at 211 W. Temple Street, Los Angeles, California 90012, is a legal resident of Los Angeles County, California, and is amenable to service of process in Los Angeles County.

- 3. Respondent Villanueva is the Los Angeles County Sheriff and he is sued here in his official capacity only.
- 4. The true names and/or capacities, whether individual, corporate, associate or otherwise of the defendants DOES 1 through 50, inclusive, and each of them, are unknown to Petitioner who therefore sues said respondents by such fictitious names. Petitioner is informed and believes and thereon alleges that each of these respondents fictitiously named herein as a DOE is legally responsible, negligent or in some other actionable manner liable for the events and happenings hereinafter referred to, and proximately and legally caused the damages to Petitioner as hereinafter alleged. Petitioner will seek leave of the Court to amend this Complaint to insert the true names and/or capacities of such fictitiously-named respondents when the same has been ascertained.
- 5. Petitioner is informed and believes and thereon alleges that at all times mentioned herein, Respondents, and each of them, including DOES 1 through 50, Inclusive, were the agents, servants, employees, and/or joint venturers of their corespondents, and were, as such, acting within the course, scope, and authority of said agency, employment, and/or venture.

JURISDICTION AND VENUE

- 6. This Court has jurisdiction under Cal. Gov't Code § 6258 and Cal. Civ. Proc. Code §§ 1060, 1085.
- 7. Venue is proper in this Court pursuant to Cal. Gov't Code § 6259 and Cal. Civ. Proc. Code §§ 393, 394(a).

FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS

- 8. Respondent Sheriff's Department is an agency of the State of California, and as such, is governed by the public disclosure requirements of Article I, § 3 of the California Constitution and the CPRA, Cal. Gov't Code § 6250 et seq.
- 9. Respondent Villanueva is the Sheriff for Respondent Sheriff's Department.

 The agency designated this position as a reasonable authority to receive and respond on behalf of Respondent Sheriff's Department to requests for public records under the CPRA.

- 10. The involved parties have litigated before. Petitioner initiated a prior action in 2015 against the Respondent Sheriff's Department and the Medical Examiner's Office pursuant to the CPRA, seeking various records relating to the death of Ms. Wood. See Perroni v. Fajardo et al., Superior Court of the State of California for the County of Los Angeles, Case No. BS 159430. Petitioner through both orders of this Court and settlement prevailed in this action, receiving some records that the defendants in that case had failed to produce in response to CPRA requests.
- 11. On October 8, 2020, Petitioner submitted a new written CPRA request to Respondent Sheriff's Department seeking the disclosure of ten (10) categories of additional public records. A true and correct copy of the written CPRA request is attached to this Complaint as **Exhibit A** and incorporated herein. Specifically, the request sought the disclosure of the following specific categories of public records related to the 1981 death of Natalie Wood Wagner:
 - First, copies of all records regarding Vidal Herrera's statement to the Sheriff's
 Department that is referenced at endnote 481 of Suzanne Finstad's
 republished book, Natalie Wood: The Complete Biography;
 - b. Second, copies of an 8"x11" divider file card for the Sheriff's Department's file regarding the death of Ms. Wood (identified by Detective Louis Danoff's August 17, 2020, declaration that was filed in Perroni v. Fajardo et al., Superior Court of the State of California for the County of Los Angeles, Central District; Case No. BS 159430) and any other records showing who removed, checked out, or otherwise received access to this file;
 - c. Third, copies of Respondent Sheriff's Department's computer program records regarding the Sheriff Department's file concerning the death of Ms. Wood, including any records regarding the identity of persons or entities who have removed, checked out, or otherwise received access to this file from the library described by Detective Danoff in his August 17, 2020, declaration;

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- fourth, copies of all personnel records reflecting discipline, admonition, or demotion of Detective Danoff for the period November 1, 2000, through December 31, 2010;
- e. Fifth, copies of all records reflecting communications between Respondent Sheriff's Department (including but not limited to Deputy Ralph Hernandez and counsel for Respondent Sheriff Department) and Ms. Finstad for the period November 10, 2015, through October 8, 2020;
- f. Sixth, copies of all records reflecting communications between Respondent Sheriff's Department (including but not limited to Detective Danoff) and Ms. Finstad for the period of November 1, 2000, through November 30, 2000;
- g. Seventh, copies of all records reflecting communications between Respondent Sheriff's Department (including but not limited to counsel for Respondent Sheriff Department) and Detective Danoff for the period March 1, 2020, through October 8, 2020;
- Eighth, copies of all personnel records reflecting discipline, admonition, or demotion of Deputy Hernandez for the period January 1, 2016, through October 8, 2020;
- i. Ninth, copies of Respondent Sheriff's Department's file regarding the death of Ms. Wood (also known as the "murder book" or "blue book") as it existed in November 2000 when Ms. Finstad claimed on pages 452 and 458-59 of her book Natalie Wood: The Complete Biography that she received access to a box or boxes consisting of the entire murder book for Ms. Wood;
- j. Tenth, a copy of the Marilyn Wayne pink phone message that is referenced in Ms. Finstad's book.
- See Ex. A. A check in the amount of \$200.00 was enclosed to cover the cost of production.
- 12. Notwithstanding the provisions of Cal Gov't Code § 6253(c), which requires an agency response to the request within ten (10) days of receipt, Petitioner did not hear

- 13. The additional fourteen (14) days added to Respondent Sheriff's Department's deadline to respond to Petitioner's CPRA request through its October 28, 2020, exercise of the extension pursuant to Cal. Gov't Code § 6253(c)(1) has since passed, and Respondent Sheriff's Department failed to respond timely as required by law.
- 14. Petitioner has received no further response from Respondent Sheriff's

 Department and there has been no production of documents as requested in Petitioner's

 CPRA request.

FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION - WRIT OF MANDATE

(By Petitioner, SAMUEL A. PERRONI

Against Respondents, and Each of Them)

- 15. Petitioner incorporates herein by reference the factual allegations set forth in paragraphs 1 through 14.
- 16. The California Constitution, Art. I, § 3(b)(1), declares that "[t]he people have the right of access to information concerning the conduct of the people's business, and, therefore, the meetings of public bodies and the writings of public officials and agencies shall be open to public scrutiny."

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- open to inspection at all times during the office hours of the state or local agency and every person has a right to inspect any public record, except as hereafter provided." The CPRA further provides that each agency must respond "within 10 days." *Id.* at § 6253(c). The CPRA further requires that "the head of the agency or their designee" may make extensions "in unusual circumstances," but only by written notice to the person making the request, "setting forth the reasons for the extension and the date on which a determination is expected to be dispatched." *Id.* The CPRA also limits extensions: "[n]o notice shall specify a date that would result in an extension for more than 14 days." *Id.*
- 18. Respondents Sheriff's Department and Villanueva violated the California Constitution and Cal. Gov't Code § 6253 because they unjustifiably: (1) failed to respond to Petitioner's October 8, 2020, CPRA request within ten (10) days of its receipt of the request; (2) when it did respond by exercising the fourteen (14) day-extension of its response deadline (which had already passed), failed to set forth in its untimely response the date on which a determination was expected to be dispatched; and (3) failed to respond to the CPRA request within the fourteen (14) day-extended-response deadline.
- 19. Respondents Sheriff's Department's and Villanueva's violation of Cal. Gov't Code § 6253 and the California Constitution through their unjustifiable failure to provide a timely response to Petitioner's written CPRA request even after their untimely exercise of the fourteen (14) day-response deadline constitute a waiver of Respondents' ability to claim exemptions for any of the ten requests for records presented to it by Petitioner in its written October 8, 2020, CPRA request.
- 20. Further, in addition to the requirements of the CPRA and Respondents' waiver, a prior order from this Court compels Respondents Sheriff's Department and Villanueva to produce the records requested in the first, ninth, and tenth categories of documents requested by Petitioner. In the 2015 lawsuit referenced above, this Court ruled that whatever portions of the 1981 Sheriff's Department file that author Suzanne Finstad (or any other author or member of the public) had been given access to, the same records

At some point in our conversation, [Detective] Rasure mentioned the possible existence of a murder book, the file of all the evidence in a homicide investigation, including a summary of the case, all interviews, investigative reports, field and lab reports, photographs, and printouts.

On a tip from the genial Rasure, I dropped his name to an LAPD detective, Louis Danoff, with the nickname "Sweet Lou," and persuaded him to let me see the murder book for the Wood investigation, which did, in fact, exist. Within a week, I met Sweet Lou at a Sheriff's Department office on the outskirts of downtown. My mother, who was in Los Angeles for Thanksgiving, came along, a camera tucked into her purse.

Sweet Lou escorted both of us to a small spare room. Inside were a long table and several chairs. I set up my laptop on the table and Sweet Lou returned with one or two boxes he identified as Natalie Wood's murder book. Then he left the room and closed the door.

Uncertain how long I would have, what I was permitted to see, or whether I could document it. I began to enter the contents of the murder book into my laptop as quickly as I could type. I asked my mother to take photographs. We both kept an eye on the door, anxious that Sweet Lou might return with restrictions. Neither of us said anything. We both got the sense that we were looking at something that was not meant to be seen.

Id. (emphasis added).

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22. Respondents Sheriff's Department and Villanueva have waived any applicable CPRA exemptions pursuant to Cal. Gov't Code § 6254.5 by these public disclosures of the Ms. Wood 1981 investigative file or "murder book." This Court, at a hearing in the 2015 lawsuit, concluded as much during the following exchange:

THE COURT: Look, I agree with you, you don't. If there was any issue that what they are withholding is not - but you are specifically asking for photographs and witness interview summaries and yacht examinations and the Miller report. All of those, by definition, are investigatory records. So there is no point in me looking at the very things you have asked for. If you had asked for something else that might not be an investigatory record, that would be different, which is why I am saying they have to – the Coroner has to say anything they are withholding, what is it. It is investigatory record. Now if you want me to look at that and if you want me to look at the records the Coroner is withholding, I may do that.

MR. PERRONI: I understand, Judge. But here's the state of the record. The state of the record is that in 2000 and 2001 they allowed two authors to rummage through these files.

THE COURT: Did they?

MR. PERRONI: Okay.

THE COURT: Did they? I'm not aware that the authors were given the files to rummage through. I am aware that they were given documents from the file.

MR. PERRONI: No. They were given access to the file.

THE COURT: If they were given the file to look through, the whole file is disclosable.

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See September 27, 2016, Hearing Transcript, attached to this Complaint as Exhibit C and incorporated herein, at pp. 33:26-34:25 (emphasis added). The Court, during this September 2016 hearing, agreed that Petitioner was entitled to production of whatever portions of the file to which a member of the public had been previously granted access. The Court subsequently adopted its tentative rulings and orders, including the court's legal conclusions at the hearing and entered a judgment granting Petitioner's petition for a writ of mandate in part, pursuant to established legal precedent and provisions of the Act regarding selective access disclosure. See January 26, 2017, Judgment Re Petition for Writ of Mandate, attached to this Complaint as **Exhibit D** and incorporated herein, at p. 2

and §§6253 and 6254.5, *supra*. The Court's legal conclusions on selective disclosure are now res judicata and operate as a conclusive adjudication in this action.

- 23. By their failure to provide timely compliance with the CPRA as well as their continuing failure to provide documents responsive to any of the categories of documents listed in Exhibit A attached hereto, Respondents have violated this Court's prior order as well as the California Constitution, Art. I, § 3, and the CPRA, Cal. Gov't Code § 6250 et seq., and thereby caused Petitioner to obtain legal counsel to obtain the desired relief.
- 24. As a result of the aforementioned conduct, Petitioner requests issue of a writ of mandate directing Respondents to comply fully and without further delay with the California Public Records Act and to furnish to Petitioner all public documents meeting the descriptions in his ten requests set forth in Exhibit A attached hereto.

SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION – DECLARATORY RELIEF (Petitioner, SAMUEL A. PERRONI

(Felitioner, SAMOLL A. PLRKON

Against Respondents, and Each of Them)

- 25. Petitioner incorporates herein by reference the factual allegations set forth in paragraphs 1 through 24, inclusive, above, as though fully set forth herein.
- 26. An actual future controversy exists between the parties hereto relating to their rights, duties, and liabilities.
- 27. Petitioner contends that Respondents have violated Petitioner's rights under the California Constitution, Art. I, § 3, and under Cal. Gov't Code § 6250 et seq., by failing to produce the requested documents and accordingly, judicial determination of these issues and of the respective duties of Petitioner and Respondents is necessary and appropriate at this time under the circumstances.
- 28. As a result of the aforementioned conduct, Petitioner seeks a declaration from the Court that Respondents have violated Petitioner's rights under the California Constitution, Art. I, § 3, and under Cal. Gov't Code § 6250 et seq. by failing to produce the requested documents, Respondents have waived any applicable CPRA exemptions pursuant to Cal. Gov't Code § 6254.5 by the aforementioned public disclosures, Petitioner

is entitled to production of those portions of the file to which a member of the public had been previously granted access, and Petitioner is entitled to judgment for costs and expenses in bringing the instant action, including reasonable attorneys' fees. Petitioner is informed, believes, and thereon alleges that Respondents, and each of them, contend to the contrary.

THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION - INJUNCTIVE RELIEF

(Petitioner, SAMUEL A. PERRONI

Against Respondents, and Each of Them)

- 29. Petitioner incorporates herein by reference the factual allegations set forth in paragraphs 1 through 28, inclusive, above, as though fully set forth herein.
- 30. Petitioner is informed and believes and thereon alleges that Respondents' delay in complying with their obligations under the CPRA was without substantial justification. Accordingly, pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure, §3367, Petitioner seeks an injunction from the Court directing Respondents to waive all fees associated with Petitioner's requests.

PRAYER FOR RELIEF

WHEREFORE, Petitioner respectfully requests that this Court:

- 1. Issue a writ of mandate directing Respondents to comply fully and without further delay with the California Public Records Act and to furnish to Petitioner all public documents meeting the descriptions in his ten requests set forth in Exhibit A attached hereto;
- 2. In the alternative, issue an Order to Respondents to show cause why the Court should not issue such a writ and thereafter issue a peremptory writ compelling Respondents to perform their public duty as set forth above;
- 3. Declare that Respondents have violated Petitioner's rights under the California Constitution, Art. I, § 3, and under Cal. Gov't Code § 6250 et seq., by failing to produce the requested documents;

BARNES & THORNBURG LLP

2029 Century Park East, Suite 300 Los Angeles, CA 90067-2904 U.S.A. (310) 284-3880 Fax (310) 284-3894

www.btlaw.com

Garrett S. Llewellyn Of Counsel (310) 284-3876 gllewellyn@btlaw.com

October 8, 2020

Daniel P. Barer, Esq. Pollak, Vida & Barer 11500 W. Olympic Blvd., Suite 400 Los Angeles, CA 90064 daniel@pollakvida.com

Sheriff's Services Division
Sheriff's Department, County of Los Angeles
211 W. Temple Street, First Floor
Los Angeles, CA 90012
prarequests@lasd.org

VIA E-MAIL & U.S. MAIL

Re: Sam Perroni

California Public Records Request For Records

Dear Mr. Barer and Sheriff's Services Division:

As you know from my May 23, 2020, letter, our law firm represents Sam Perroni regarding his public-records requests. In view of the ruling made by Judge Chalfant at our September 1, 2020, hearing, I am writing to you on behalf of Mr. Perroni to make new requests for public records under the California Public Records Act ("CPRA").

First, we request copies of all records regarding Vidal Herrera's statement to the Sheriff's Department that is referenced at endnote 481 of Suzanne Finstad's republished book, *Natalie Wood: The Complete Biography*. Specifically, at endnote 481, Ms. Finstad referenced receiving a 2017 "Vidal Herrera statement to L.A. Sheriff's Department."

Second, Detective Louis Danoff's August 17, 2020, declaration that was filed in *Perroni v. Fajardo et al.*, Superior Court of the State of California for the County of Los Angeles, Central District; Case No. BS 159430, states this: "An ABC, 3"x5" card system was set up wherein each case entered into the Library was given a Library Number based upon the first letter of the name used to identify the case and followed by the number indicating when it was logged into the system – Example (A-200). If a case was removed from the Library, the Investigator requesting the case would fill out an 8"x11" divider file card with the Library Number requested, date requested, and

the name of the requestor." This card was then placed in the space from which the file was removed and would be removed when the file was returned." Pursuant to the CPRA, we request copies of this divider file card for the Sheriff Department's file regarding the death of Natalie Wood and any other records showing who removed, checked out, or otherwise received access to this file.

Third, Detective Danoff's declaration further states that this card system was updated "into a simple computer program" around 1990. Later in his declaration, Detective Danoff states that, around 2001, "Homicide Bureau was in the midst of converting their reporting system to an improved computerized system." Pursuant to the CPRA, we request copies of all such computer program records regarding the Sheriff Department's file concerning the death of Natalie Wood, including any records regarding the identity of persons or entities who have removed, checked out, or otherwise received access to this file from the library described by Detective Danoff. To the extent that there is a separate file for the 2011 investigation into the death of Ms. Wood, we may this request for both the original file and the file regarding the 2011 investigation.

Fourth, Ms. Finstad's book indicates that Detective Danoff gave her access to the Sheriff Department's file regarding the death of Ms. Wood in November 2000. Detective Danoff's declaration indicates that he last worked for the Sheriff's Department in 2010. Pursuant to the CPRA, we request copies of all personnel records reflecting discipline, admonition, or demotion of Detective Danoff for the period November 1, 2000, through December 31, 2010.

Fifth, in *Perroni v. Fajardo et al.*, Superior Court of the State of California for the County of Los Angeles, Central District; Case No. BS 159430, respondents filed a July 15, 2016, declaration from Deputy Sheriff Ralph Hernandez. In paragraphs 7 and 8 of that declaration, Deputy Hernandez identified certain documents that the Sheriff's Department provided to Ms. Finstad and members of the public. In the subsequent November 8, 2016, deposition of Deputy Hernandez, he testified regarding his communications with Ms. Finstad. Pursuant to the CPRA, we request all records reflecting communications between the Sheriff's Department (including but not limited to Deputy Hernandez and counsel for the Sheriff's Department) and Ms. Finstad for the period November 10, 2015, through today.

Sixth, as discussed above, Ms. Finstad has written that Detective Danoff gave her access to the Sheriff Department's file regarding the death of Ms. Wood in November 2000. Pursuant to the CPRA, we request all records reflecting communications between the Sheriff's Department (including but not limited to Detective Danoff) and Ms. Finstad for the period November 1, 2000, through November 30, 2000.

Seventh, Mr. Perroni contacted Mr. Barer in March 2020 requesting supplemental documents. Detective Danoff's declaration states that he has not worked for the Sheriff's Department since March 2020. Pursuant to the CPRA, we request all records reflecting communications between the Sheriff's Department (including but not limited to counsel for the Sheriff's Department) and Detective Danoff for the period March 1, 2020, through today.

Eighth, pursuant to the CPRA, we request copies of all personnel records reflecting discipline, admonition, or demotion of Deputy Hernandez for the period January 1, 2016, through today.

Ninth, pursuant to the CPRA, we request copies of the Sheriff's Department file regarding the death of Ms. Wood (also known as the "murder book" or "blue book") as it existed in November 2000 when Ms. Finstad claims that she received access to a box or boxes consisting of the entire murder book for Ms. Wood. As I wrote to your previously, Ms. Finstad's updated book provides:

Homicide detectives in the L.A. Sheriff's Department keep what they call a "murder book," the official record of a homicide investigation. I was given access to Natalie Wood's murder book. There I found the buried clues as to what really happened on the last weekend of her life. . . .

Of all Natalie Wood's secrets that I held in 2001, that secret was the reason for my urgency: I had come to realize the unimaginably horrible reason that she had drowned, and I needed to make public the dark and twisted facts of her drowning and its aftermath. I had uncovered the facts using the Sheriff's murder book....

At some point in our conversation, [Detective] Rasure mentioned the possible existence of a murder book, the file of all the evidence in a homicide investigation, including a summary of the case, all interviews, investigative reports, field and lab reports, photographs, and printouts. I needed to see Natalie Wood's murder book.

On a tip from the genial Rasure, I dropped his name to an LAPD detective, Louis Danoff, with the nickname "Sweet Lou," and persuaded him to let me see the murder book for the Wood investigation, which did, in fact, exist. Within a week, I met Sweet Lou at a Sheriff's Department office on the outskirts of downtown. My mother, who was in Los Angeles for Thanksgiving, came along, a camera tucked into her purse.

Sweet Lou escorted both of us to a small spare room. Inside were a long table and several chairs. I set up my laptop on the table and **Sweet Lou returned with one or two boxes he identified as Natalie Wood's murder book**. Then he left the room and closed the door.

Uncertain how long I would have, what I was permitted to see, or whether I could document it, I began to enter the contents of the murder book into my laptop as quickly as I could type. I asked my mother to take photographs. We both kept an eye on the door, anxious that Sweet Lou might return with restrictions. Neither of us said anything. We both got the sense that we were looking at something that was not meant to be seen.

Finstad, *Natalie Wood: The Complete Biography*, at pp. 452, 458-59.

Ms. Finstad's account makes clear that she and her mother were given access to more than the scant documents identified by Deputy Sheriff Hernandez. Detective Danoff gave Ms. Finstad and her mother one or two boxes that contained the "murder book" regarding the investigation into Ms. Wood's death. What was in this murder book? Ms. Finstad recalls that the murder book included "the file of all the evidence in a homicide investigation, including a summary of the case, all interviews, investigative reports, field and lab reports, photographs, and printouts." Based on this information from Ms. Finstad, the Sheriff's Department provided to Ms. Finstad documents beyond what was identified in Deputy Sheriff Hernandez's testimony. The Sheriff's "Department waived any CPRA exemptions by the public disclosure of the Natalie Wood" murder book to Ms. Finstad and her mother, to borrow the language from Judge Chalfant's October 2016 order. This disclosure was intentional and not accidental. Accordingly, we request that the Sheriff's Department supplement its earlier production and provide to Mr. Perroni the entire box or boxes consisting of the murder book as it existed in November 2000 regarding the death of Ms. Wood.

To be clear, on behalf of Mr. Perroni, and pursuant to the CPRA, we are hereby requesting a copy of the Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department file pertaining to the investigation of the death of Ms. Wood as it would have been provided to Ms. Finstad

Tenth, pursuant to the CPRA, and to the extent not covered by the above request, we request a copy of the Marilyn Wayne pink phone message that is referenced in Ms. Finstad's book.

This CPRA request does not include any of the records that have already been produced to Mr. Perroni in his lawsuit.

I am enclosing a check for \$200.00 to cover the cost of production. If the enclosed sum is not adequate to cover the costs, please let me know and I will send the balance. I request advance notice if you contend that the costs will exceed \$500.00.

Please also note that I provided a check for \$200.00 with my May 23, 2020, letter. As no documents have been produced in response to that letter, please return or refund that check for \$200.00.

Thank you for your prompt attention to this matter. I look forward to Mr. Perroni receiving the requested documents in a timely manner.

Regards,

Garrett S. Llewellyn

Saut Sulf

THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS ULTRAVIOLET FIBERS, CHEMICALLY REACTIVE PAPER, A VOID PANTOGRAPH AND A WATERMARK ON THE BACK

BARNES & THORNBURG LLP

11 South Meridian Street Indianapolis, IN 46204-3535

TO VERIFY THE AUTHENTICITY OF THIS CHECK, RUB OR BREATHE O THE AREA ABOVE, COLOR WILL DISAPPEAR & THEN REAPPEAR. Fifth Third Bank Indianapolis, INDIANA 71-859/749 CHECK NO. 524121

CHECK DATE 10-09-2020

CHECK AMOUNT

\$ 200.00*****

TWO HUNDRED AND 00/100 Dollars

PAY TO THE ORDER OF Sheriff's Department, County of Los Angeles Sheriff's Services Division 211 W. Temple Street, First Floor

Los Angeles, CA 90012

#524121# #074908594# 7653510706#

OFFICE OF THE SHERIFF



COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES HARLOF JUSTICE



ALEX VILLANUEVA. SHERIFF

October 28, 2020

Garrett Llewellyn Barnes & Thornburg LLP 2029 Century Park E., Suite 300 Los Angeles, CA 90067-2904 Garrett.Llewellyn@btlaw.com

Dear Mr. Llewellyn:

PUBLIC RECORDS ACT REQUEST - #20-1692MI

This letter is in response to your request for records under the California Public Records Act dated October 8 and received by the Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department, Discovery Unit on October 16, 2020.

In your request you are seeking the following:

Re: Sam Perroni California Public Records Request for Records

"we request copies of all records regarding Vidal Herrera's statement to the Sheriff's Department that is referenced at endnote 481 of Suzanne Finstad's republished book, Natalie Wood: The Complete Biography. Specifically, at endnote 481, Ms. Finstad referenced receiving a 2017 "Vidal Herrea Statement to L. A. Sheriff's Department"."

Although the Sheriff's Department is obligated to respond within 10 days of receipt of the request, this time limit is subject to an extension of up to fourteen (14) days under the following circumstances as defined in Government Code § 6253(c)(1).

The need to search for, and collect, the requested records from field facilities or other establishments that are separate from the office processing the request, and the need to appropriately examine potentially voluminous amounts of records.

211 WEST TEMPLE STREET, Los Angeles, California 90012

In addition, please note that we may redact or withhold records if there are any exempt matters impacting the privacy rights of individuals (California Constitution, article I, §1, and Government Code §§ 6254(k) and 6255(a)). Other exempt matters will include those protected by the attorney-client, official information and deliberative process privileges, pending litigation exemption, personnel exemption, or other matters otherwise protected from disclosure by law or where the particular facts and circumstances warrant nondisclosure of the information (Government Code §§ 6254(b), (c), (k), and 6255(a)).

The Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department is receiving an exceptionally large volume of PRA requests and is currently experiencing an extended delay in processing them. Requests are processed in the order received; you will be notified when we start processing your request. Thank you for your patience.

If you have any questions, please contact Lieutenant Morsi of the Discovery Unit at (323) 890-5000.

Sincerely,

ALEX VILLANUEVA, SHERIFF

Welt M. Nels

Albert M. Maldonado, Captain

Risk Management Bureau

SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES

DEPARTMENT 85 HON. JAMES C. CHALFANT, JUDGE

SAMUEL A. PERRONI,)

PETITIONER,)

vs.) NO. BS159430

)

MARK A. FAJARDO, ET AL.,

RESPONDENTS.)

REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS

TUESDAY, SEPTEMBER 27, 2016

FOR PETITIONER: SAMUEL A. PERRONI, IN PRO PER

FOR RESPONDENTS: DANIEL P. BARER, ATTORNEY AT LAW and

ANNA L. BIRENBAUM, ATTORNEY AT LAW

BUFORD J. JAMES

OFFICIAL REPORTER 9296

111 NORTH HILL STREET

LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA 90012

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CASE NUMBER:
                                 BS159430
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    CASE NAME:
                                 SAMUEL PERRONI VS. MARK FAJARDO
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    LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA
                                 TUESDAY, SEPTEMBER 27, 2016
    DEPARTMENT 85
                                 HON. JAMES C. CHALFANT, JUDGE
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                                 BUFORD J. JAMES CSR 9296
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    REPORTER:
                                 1:30 P.M.
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    TIME:
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    APPEARANCES:
                                 (AS NOTED ON TITLE PAGE)
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               THE COURT: Perroni versus Farjado, BS159430,
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    number five on calendar. Your appearance, please.
               MR. BARER: Good afternoon, Your Honor, Daniel
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    Barer for respondents.
               MS. BIRENBAUM: Good afternoon, Your Honor, Anna
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    Birenbaum for respondents.
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               MR. PERRONI: Your Honor, Sam Perroni,
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    petitioner.
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               THE COURT: All right. Good afternoon.
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                    This is here on Mr. Perroni's petition for
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    writ of mandate. It is a CPRA petition. There are two
    County Departments at issue here, the Coroner's office and
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    the Sheriff's Department, from whom Mr. Perroni asked for
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    records. Actually, I spent -- well, you don't care how
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    much time I spent on this, but I actually think that the
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    outcome is mostly straightforward.
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                    Mr. Perroni says -- it's a little ambiguous,
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    but he says what he really wants are photographs of Natalie
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Wood taken at the scene of her death and any autopsy photographs subject to a protective order; Sheriff's Department witness interviews; yacht examinations and photographs, excluding analysis or conclusions by investigators; and the Miller report. I say it's ambiguous because in other portions of his briefs he points out that there may be missing items, none of which fit into those categories, I think. But, in any event, those are at least things the that were most important to him.

So the first issue is waiver for noncompliance. It is true that the CPRA requires the public agency within 10 days from the receipt of a request to respond to the requester and state whether it will comply. That is Section 6252(c). There is no remedy for noncompliance with that requirement other than to seek mandamus to compel compliance. So there is no waiver for noncompliance with the deadlines.

The majority -- or maybe all, but let's just say the majority of what Mr. Perroni seeks are covered by 6254(f), Records of Investigations Conducted by a State or Local Police Agency. In Haney, the court distinguished between investigative files which are protected or not -- exempt from disclosure only if the prospect of enforcement is concrete and definite. On the other hand, investigatory records or investigation records are exempt forever as long as the agency declines to produce.

Haney explained that they do not lose their exempt status based on whether or not there is a prospect

of enforcement. And they -- whether or not disclosure would endanger a witness or the investigation is irrelevant. The agency does not have to show a valid need to maintain the confidence of an exempt record of investigation. And while Coroners are not law enforcement agencies, they are a local agencies, and the Coroner compiles -- I wrote "complies." I meant "complies" -- investigatory files as part of his local agency duties. And Coroner's record are, therefore -- Coroner's investigative records are also exempt under 6254(f). And that exemption exists even after the investigation ends.

And Mr. Perroni argues, and I agree, despite the conclusionary statements by the Sheriff's Department, that there is no prospect of criminal enforcement in the Natalie Wood matter. Mr. Perroni points out, and I agree with this also, that the statute of limitation has long since passed for any kind of negligent homicide for anything except murder, which has no statute of limitation, and there is no reason to believe that anyone thinks, including the Sheriff or the Coroner, that anybody murdered Natalie Wood. In any event, prospect of criminal enforcement is irrelevant to disclosure of records exempt as investigative records.

And sort of as an aside, Mr. Perroni's contention that there are no witnesses or informers whose identities or statements must be kept confidential and no privacy interests at stake, meaning Natalie Wood's privacy interest, is also irrelevant. Although, I tend to believe

that Mr. Robert Wagner has a privacy interest in keeping his wife's records confidential. So the fact is that the Sheriff's Department and the Coroner could have maintained all investigative records into her death confidential, not disclosed them to anybody, and there is no balancing of public interest in that regard.

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One point that Mr. Perroni raises that I agree with is that the Coroner admits that confidential items remain within the Coroner's microfilm files that have not been released to any individuals, but they have presented no reason as to why those items remain confidential. Are they investigatory records, or is there some other basis to maintain their confidentiality? The Coroner has not asserted that.

I think the best way to go here is for the Coroner to identify, not the record, but the reason why records or categories of records that remain confidential are, in fact, being maintained as confidential, the nature of exemption. They can identify the records if they want, but there is a case that says they are not required to identify the records that they are withholding.

Okay. Photographs of Natalie Wood are protected by the Code of Civil Procedure 129(a)(2). They are absolutely protected absent a showing of good cause. There is no good cause showing here. Whatever Natalie Wood's privacy interests that died with her, there is public policy against disclosing death records or autopsy records -- pictures, I'm sorry, death pictures or autopsy

pictures. Whether or not there are family members still around, there's a societal interest in not publishing such pictures.

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However, 60- -- now we get to 6254.5, which provides that whenever a local agency discloses a public record which is otherwise exempt to any member of the public, this disclosure is waived. And that codifies the court of appeal decision in Black Panther Party versus Kehoe, K-e-h-o-e, which stated that the CPRA does not permit selective disclosure, that is, disclosure to one person, one member of the public, and not to all.

Interestingly, the Coroner could have maintained probably everything confidential, but the Coroner -- I believe that it was Noguchi who at the time was described as the Coroner to the Stars, if I recall -- felt it incumbent to disclose some records. It appears that the Sheriff's Department has disclosed less information over the years than the Coroner's office. That's just my belief. Could be wrong.

So the question is have records been disclosed to members of public. Well, Mr. Perroni relies on the authors who have received access to certain records, most particularly, Suzanne Finstad, F-i-n-s-t-a-d, was given records by the Sheriff, both before and after her book was published. Sam Cashner, C-a-s-h-n-e-r, was given access to the 1981 file. Artie Rulli, R-u-l-l-i, was given documents from the files by Detective Hernandez.

The problem Mr. Perroni has, he has not

shown what documents they were given. And it is his burden to prove that respondents have waived their right to claim an exemption. And the fact that some documents were disclosed does not create an inference that the author received any more documents than Mr. Perroni or any other member of the public has.

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Nobody, apparently, knows exactly what was disclosed to Ms. Finstad when she got five pages on March 5, 2003, but you can't draw an inference that it must be something that was previously undisclosed. And, in fact, I would have expected Ms. Finstad to publish something if she got some previously undisclosed material.

An interesting point that I learned in evaluating this is that CPRA exemptions do not work like privileges under the Evidence Code. When something is privileged under the Evidence Code and the subject matter of that document is waived, then disclosure of that document is required. The CPRA is a document-based disclosure statute. It does not matter whether the subject matter -- or the information contained in the document was previously disclosed to someone, a member of the public.

You could have two documents discussing the very same issue, one which gets disclosed, and one of which has been maintained as confidential, and the second one will always be confidential if it is an investigatory record. So the question is not whether the information contained in a record was disclosed to a member of the public, but, rather, whether the document itself was

disclosed to a member of the public previously.

Mr. Perroni makes just such an argument with respect to the Miller report, which was a report by a fellow known by the Coroner Noguchi who was an expert, apparently, in sailing. Sounded like Mr. Noguchi took a sailing class from him or otherwise knew him from sailing experience and asked him to evaluate the boat, the algae on the boat -- let me back up.

I wrote this all down, exactly what he asked him to do. Examine the stern of Wagner's yacht and the dingy for any sign of violence; examine the algae on the bottom of the yacht's swimming step to see if Natalie Wood tried to reboard the yacht; and check the sides of the dingy for fingernail scratches. He wrote a report. He was not an employee of the Coroner, but he did perform the act; wrote the report; submitted it to the Coroner, which Mr. Noguchi used. He did not release, but wrote about in his memoir. And he wrote, quote, rereading the report today, I can see Isthmus Bay again in my mind's eye, dark and threatening in the night, et cetera.

Now, Mr. Perroni argues that the Miller report -- first of all, the Coroner's office representative said that -- admitted that Coroner investigator narratives are disclosable. Mr. Perroni found online a narrative by Pamela Eaker, E-a-k-e-r, which he described as unmistakably an investigative narrative, and the Miller report is no different. There is no reasoned basis to distinguish the Miller report from the Eaker report for purposes of

disclosure.

While I suspect he may be right, I don't evaluate it in that way because it seems to me that, despite the fact that Mr. Noguchi testified that he does not have the Miller report, he also testified that he did not take any Coroner documents with him when he retired, he had to have had the Miller report when wrote the memoir. Taking him at his own statement, he had it in his hand as he was writing the memoir.

It's also true that in the reopening of the case the Coroner -- the then Coroner met with Mr. Noguchi and Mr. Miller as well as members of the Sheriff's Department in 2012 and gave Mr. Miller a copy of his own report for purposes of the meeting. And I think it was pretty clear that Mr. Noguchi had the report also.

Now, whether he took it away from the meeting, I don't know. I don't know there is evidence of that, but it seems to me to be pretty -- I mean, borderline -- how would I put it. The purposes of the CPRA are not served by allowing Mr. Noguchi to take and use the report for his memoir and then claim that it is part of an investigative record that should not be disclosed. I think, by giving it to him when he was no longer the Coroner and no longer held public office, even if he gave it back, it was disclosed to a member of the public and there is a waiver.

Therefore, the tentative is to grant the petition, in part, by requiring disclosure of the Miller

report by the Coroner's office, not the Sheriff's

Department, and requiring the Coroner at least state by way

of declaration the basis on which other records are being

withheld. That's what the tentative says.

Have you seen it?

MR. BARER: Yes, Your Honor.

MR. PERRONI: Yes.

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THE COURT: Mr. Perroni, do you wish to be heard?

MR. PERRONI: Yes, Your Honor. I got it when --

I got it and read it when I got here.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. PERRONI: Okay.

THE COURT: You want to be heard?

MR. PERRONI: Yes, sir, I do.

THE COURT: Go ahead.

MR. PERRONI: All right. Because I want to make sure that I don't miss anything -- last time I was in here, I made the mistake of trying to lip read because I just have this issue about talking to people and not looking at them. But because this is so important today, I am going to have to look at this screen most of the time, and I apologize for not looking at you when you are taking.

THE COURT: That's fine.

MR. PERRONI: That's number one. Two, I hope you would indulge me a second on a little housekeeping before we get going.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. PERRONI: All right. May I ask the Court

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what a Statement of Decision is?
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              THE COURT: I can't give you legal advice.
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              MR. PERRONI: All right.
              THE COURT: It's in the Rules of Court.
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              MR. PERRONI: Well, I'm not asking you to give me
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             I just read your local rules, and the local rule
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    says that when I get a tentative decision like this that I
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    can make a request for a Statement of Decision pursuant to
    Rule 3.1590(d), as in "dog."
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               THE COURT: Yes. That's not a local rule.
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    That's a Rule of Court. That's a rule for the whole state,
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    in other words, not local, not for L.A. Superior Court.
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    That is a rule that governs all courts in the state.
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              MR. PERRONI: All right. Well, I apologize
    again. I didn't mean to offend you by it --
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              THE COURT: No, I'm not easy to offend.
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              MR. PERRONI: Rule of California Court, I guess,
    procedurally I am going to have to make a request for this,
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    since I don't thoroughly understand this tentative decision
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    issue and how these orders are supposed to finally get
    final.
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              THE COURT: Okay. So this is my Statement of
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    Decision.
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              MR. PERRONI: All right.
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              THE COURT: It's a Tentative Statement of
    Decision.
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              MR. PERRONI: All right. But my understanding is
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    that, under the law, that's not a final order. So how does
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it get to be a final order?

THE COURT: It's going to be a final order because, assuming I adopt it. Let me explain to you the purpose of a Tentative Statement of Decision.

MR. PERRONI: Okay.

THE COURT: You, I believe, are a trial lawyer or were a trial lawyer. After a court trial when a judge makes a decision, often the judge asks the winning party to prepare a Tentative Statement of Decision. Since that winning party tends to slant the wording, the language, in their favor, the Rules of Court were adopted that permit the another side to object to the Tentative Statement of Decision before it becomes final. That is the purpose of the rule for Tentative Statement of Decision, and then you have the right to object to the Tentative Statement of Decision, and then the judge adopts the Final Statement of Decision.

Where I write my own decisions, and I assure you I wrote this, it makes no sense to me to have a Tentative Statement of Decision and then have the parties object to it. But if you want the right to object, you have the right to object. I'm telling you right now I'm going to overrule your objections if I adopt this tentative as my -- whatever I do adopt. Sometimes I adopt the tentative as modified at the hearing, but whatever I say at the end of the today, I am like a shark, I go forward, I don't go back. I'm not going to revisit this issue because you have filed objections to my Tentative Statement of

Decision.

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But you have every right to do so. If you want me to call this -- that's why I don't call my

Tentative Decision a Tentative Statement of Decision, for that very reason, because I don't want to invite objections. But you have the right to have it called a Tentative Statement of Decision, and if you want that, that's what I'll call it.

MR. PERRONI: Oh. I appreciate that explanation. I just wanted to make sure before we go forward if this thing gets to some kind of appellate review that I didn't do something I was supposed to do. So you have explained it. I understand the procedure.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. PERRONI: We can go forward. There is no problem.

THE COURT: Okay. Go ahead.

MR. PERRONI: I appreciate it. All right.

The next thing is I know this is a tentative ruling, Your Honor, but I've been around judges long enough to know if they have made up their mind, I can argue with them till the cows come home, and I'm not going to change it, but what I would like to do, what I would like to do this afternoon, is take a little time to reason with you about some issues in this case that perhaps maybe I didn't articulate well enough in my briefs but that I want this Court to consider before we just merely adopt this tentative decision.

So here is what I would like to do. First of all, I would like to put this entire case in context, number one, I looked, I didn't find any cases that even remotely come close to the fact situation we have in this case. None. That's number one --

THE COURT: I'm not sure what you mean, "facts."
You mean a criminal investigation that went nowhere? I
mean, it happens all the time.

MR. PERRONI: No. Where somebody makes a request for public records in connection with police and coroner files that are 35 years old.

THE COURT: I can think of many famous cases, most of them Hollywood cases, where I would be surprised if all of the records have been produced by the law enforcement.

MR. PERRONI: Well, I am just saying I didn't find any reported cases.

THE COURT: That is true.

MR. PERRONI: That's all. All right.

Number two. This case involves celebrity, not only the celebrity that passed away, but celebrities that were on the boat that night, Robert Wagner and Christopher Walken, but as this Courts knows and would agree with me there is no celebrity exception in the California Public Records Act.

THE COURT: There is not.

MR. PERRONI: Okay. Now, we have this death 35 years ago. There is four people on the boat. One of them

ends up in the water. That leaves three folks. When -the record is clear on this and it's undisputed. When the
Sheriff's office were sent out there, they were sent out
to, quote, investigate the circumstances of a celebrity
death.

Now, the Court has indicated in its tentative ruling that there's just no other reason for them to be going out there other than to investigate a crime. And I submit to you -- and I can give you statutory authority for it -- that there is. The Sheriff's office and the Coroner's office have statutory authority to engage in searches and rescues. They don't have to go out there because they think there is a crime. They can go out there because somebody is in the water or somebody is missing or somebody needs to be dug out of there.

THE COURT: This isn't -- this is neither a search, nor a rescue.

MR. PERRONI: Well --

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THE COURT: She was dead.

MR. PERRONI: Judge, all I'm doing is I'm reviewing the facts of the case. The undisputed facts are they went out to investigate the circumstances of a celebrity death.

THE COURT: Right.

MR. PERRONI: Okay. Now, number two. When they got there, the very first person on the scene was a sheriff who was on the island all the time. He was assigned to the island. So what did he do, he prepared a report. And what

was his report, his report was the apparent, accidental drowning of a celebrity. That's in the record. It's undisputed.

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Number two, 11 days later, 11 days later, this file was inactivated. It wasn't closed. It is really important. It was inactivated after 11 days, and it was inactivated -- and this is in the file, this is in the record, this is undisputed -- as a person dead, accidental drowning.

Now, let's take Haney. Number one, in Haney, there was a complaint of possible criminal -- criminal activity. That's why the police went there in the first place. Number two, in Haney's case, Haney was the suspect. He was the one who was stopped and handcuffed. Why, because the complainant said that Haney had a pistol. So he was stopped for suspicion of having an illegal weapon in his possession, a crime. His request was made 11 days after they started this.

Now, the Haney case specifically says in there that the case is limited to the records in that case. It didn't expand this 6254(f) exemption at all. It didn't overrule Williams. It didn't overrule Uribe. It dealt specifically with that case and a request made by the suspect in a criminal activity for records. And what Haney did was Haney addressed the circumstances behind a swift request for public records in a suspicious criminal activity.

THE COURT: Doesn't have to be suspicious. Look,

there is -- if you are trying to argue to me there was no criminal investigation, I mean, that just isn't going to fly. It is the potential to find out if a crime has occurred that is important, and there is no reason for the Coroner to conduct an autopsy if everybody knows it was an accident. They do not autopsy accident victims unless there is any possibility, and it can be a remote possibility, of potential criminal activity.

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MR. PERRONI: Judge, I agree with you 100 percent, but the issue is the records. We're not talking about why they performed the autopsy. We're talking about at the time the autopsy report prepared, was it an investigatory record. And the only way -- the only way it could be is if there's a concrete and definite prospect of criminal law enforcement proceedings. And the record in this case shows that by the time Dr. Noguchi finished his autopsy and prepared his report, it was an accident.

THE COURT: You are confusing a file with a record. That's what -- Haney makes a clear distinction between an investigative file and an investigative record. They are not the same. The file could have newspaper articles in it, for example. It could have letters from friends. Those are not investigative in nature, but they would be in the file. And they are not protected from disclosure unless there is a concrete prospect of criminal enforcement, but the investigative record is protected forever.

MR. PERRONI: Well, Judge, that's only if the

investigation of suspected criminal activity. That's what Haney stands for, suspected criminal activity.

THE COURT: Potential.

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MR. PERRONI: There was none in this case.

THE COURT: Potential. There is no reason for them to go. There is no reason for the Sheriff to be there. There is no reason for the Coroner to do an autopsy unless this woman who -- I might add beautiful woman, this beautiful woman who was in a nightgown drowned of a boat with her husband and two other men on the boat unless there's the potential for criminal activity.

The obvious question is what was she doing, why was she getting into the dingy, why didn't they know she was getting in the dingy. These are obvious questions, and they all relate to the potential for criminal activity.

MR. PERRONI: But, judge, that's not what they proved. See, what they have done is they have trapped you into this mind set of assuming that that is why they went out there. That's why I started my argument with the proposition that this involves a celebrity. When you say there is no reason other reason for them to be out there, I'm sorry, Judge, but this lady was Hollywood royalty.

THE COURT: She was.

MR. PERRONI: There is all the reason in the world for them to be out there.

THE COURT: You mean because they are just curious?

MR. PERRONI: For instance, when John Kennedy

crashed into the ocean, they sent the military and everyone else out there to find him. Not because they thought there was a crime, but because it was John Kennedy.

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THE COURT: Maybe so. Maybe you should file your lawsuit in Massachusetts for reimbursement of the public.

MR. PERRONI: That's exactly what happened in this case, Your Honor. Exactly. And, see, this is the -- this is what the record shows. This is not Sam Perroni.

THE COURT: Look, you are spending a lot time on a nonissue. There's no way this was not investigation for potential criminal activity. And Haney says even routine investigations such as a traffic stop are protected. This is completely protected. So you need to move on to an issue that you can actually win on. This one is a non-starter.

MR. PERRONI: Yes, sir. I will move on to another issue here, another point. All right. And that is this: This waiver issue. All right.

I made an objection to the two declarations in this case on this ground. I said that it violates due process of law for the respondents in this case to assert and affirmative defense, refuse to answer questions about it directly relating to it, and then to put a declaration in front of you that speaks towards that particular affirmative defense.

Now, I haven't seen a ruling, but I assume you overruled that. Is that true?

THE COURT: Well, when you say "overruled," now

you mean your most recent filing?

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MR. PERRONI: Yes.

THE COURT: Your supplemental objection document?

MR. PERRONI: My supplemental objection.

THE COURT: I looked at that this morning. As you know and I know, those are not evidentiary objections. You are attempting to raise a due process issue that's not in the briefs, and the answer to your objection, which is not evidentiary, therefore, I did not rule on it, is that you should have made your motion to compel properly and obtained answers to the questions that you were interested in on waiver, if that's what your concern is.

I will also say that I didn't find the declaration enormously persuasive. For example, I agreed with you that I don't think it's a live investigation any more than you do, even though the Declaration of Detective Hernandez says it's an open investigation. So I don't know that you should be too exercised about the declarations.

Even if you leave aside the declarations, it's your burden to show on waiver that these -- some documents were given to somebody else who is a member of the public that were not given to you, and you haven't done that.

MR. PERRONI: And that's exactly what I am trying to address. In his deposition, I specifically asked Detective Hernandez multiple questions. It took me five pages to extracts this is out of him. I was specifically telling him that I was asking these questions for a basis

of waiver, and I was asking him about what it was that he gave -- that anybody in the Department gave Suzanne Finstad.

He has testified under oath, Your Honor, in that deposition that they wouldn't even let him have the files and that he had no idea that -- he had no idea whether Suzanne Finstad was even one of the persons they gave the information to. Then he turns around in a declaration and swears to you where I can't cross-examine him that here is a list of things that were given to Suzanne Finstad.

Now, here is what I submit at this point in time that the Court should do, and the evidence rules that you can do it. When a party has refused to answer questions, you can use that hold as an adverse inference. If you would like the pages in his testimony where he testified to that, I can give them to you from the appendix.

THE COURT: Where does he say what he gave to -- what Finstad was given?

MR. PERRONI: All right. If you will look at his declaration on paragraph 6 and 7, he talks about -- about what it is that he is saying now that was given to Suzanne Finstad. However --

THE COURT: I mean, it does not really say.

MR. PERRONI: If you will look -- if you will look at pages -- Exhibit 4, pages 36 and 37, and 39 and to 41 in the reply brief, the rebuttal brief. If you look at

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Hernandez Exhibit 4. That's -- I think that's the next to
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    the last one, maybe. Okay. Then if you will look down at
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    the bottom, we've numbered them --
              THE COURT: No, I saw this. Let me interrupt.
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    What does that mean? "I don't know because you see they
    won't give me the file." What does that mean?
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              MR. BARER: Your Honor, that's under the Q.
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    says that's what Mr. Perroni said, not what Detective
    Hernandez said. Page 63, lines 15 and 16.
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              THE COURT: It's Mr. Perroni saying, "They won't
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    give me the file." Okay. So page 63 what?
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              MR. BARER: Lines 15 and 16.
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              MR. PERRONI: Your Honor, he's --
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              THE COURT: I don't have page -- yeah, you are
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    saying that's part of the question.
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              MR. BARER: Yes, Your Honor.
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              THE COURT: So where is the answer? It's not
    here.
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              MS. BIRENBAUM: On page 64 Mr. Perroni rephrases
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    the question.
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              THE COURT: So he's not saying -- nowhere does
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    Detective Hernandez say he didn't have access to the file.
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              MS. BIRENBAUM: No, at 64, line 2, Mr. Perroni
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    says, "Let me start over. In other words, here is a new
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    question."
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              THE COURT:
                          Yeah. Okay, it did give me pause to
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    see, "They won't give me the file." Okay.
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So Mr. Perroni, back to you.

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MR. PERRONI: All right. Judge, of course, you know, I didn't hear exactly what was said --

THE COURT: Go ahead and read it.

MR. PERRONI: -- what was said a minute ago.

THE COURT: Go ahead and read it.

MR. PERRONI: Let me read this to you.

"Do you know if anyone else in the Department has given Suzanne Finstad anything out of the file?" This is Exhibit 4. We've labeled it as Exhibit page 36.

Then I say, "This is personal knowledge."
So I am asking this witness his personal knowledge as to whether or not anyone in the Department has given Suzanne Finstad anything out of the files.

Then I say, "I'm just asking you do you know." Then the witness goes, "To who? Given to who?" I say, "Suzanne Finstad." And then it goes, "Actual documents out of the file." I said, "Or information." Then the answer, "What kind of information?" Then I say, "Anything about the files. I don't know, you see, because they won't give me the file. So I don't know how to ask this other than you could either give somebody a file or you can tell somebody what is in the file." Then it goes over --

THE COURT: But that doesn't say it's an answer.

MR. PERRONI: -- then it says, "So what I'm

trying to do, I'm trying to find out if all you have waived anything, given things to people who don't have a reason to

know about it other than they are trying to get information from you. And my question, specifically to you" -- this is on page 40 -- "do you know if anyone in the Department has given Suzanne Finstad any information out of the file."

Answer, "Okay. No." It goes again, "No, but I'm trying -- but I am under perjury here." So, see, he's thinking about what he's saying -- "under oath, and I'm just trying to think. I believe she was a -- I think she was one of the authors, and the problem is I'm not sure, and so that's why some of your questions are also unfair" -- I am being unfair here -- "but I believe she was one of the authors who gained access to the file when it was closed and inactive."

Then I say, "Okay." Then answer, "I couldn't tell you without a doubt who allowed her access. Okay." Then he says this: "And I couldn't tell you it was her that was given access back then." Then he comes along and he swears in a declaration, not only was she given access, but he swears to what she was given access to.

THE COURT: But he doesn't. He does not say what she got.

MR. PERRONI: What I'm getting at, Judge, is, you see, they should not be allowed to create an investigatory exemption in 2016 on records that were created in 1981.

They shouldn't be allowed --

THE COURT: It's always been there. The flip side of this is you shouldn't be -- I'm not saying you can't, but you shouldn't be allowed to ask a witness

questions about access to files that took place in ninety -- when did this -- when did this occur?

MS. BIRENBAUM: The original death, '81.

THE COURT: No. Finstad's access to file information. When was the fax sent?

MR. PERRONI: She got access to the file about 2000, Your Honor.

THE COURT: So we're talking 16 years ago.

MR. PERRONI: That's right. He wasn't even there then.

THE COURT: He was not. And it's pretty hard -unless they kept a record of what they gave, which,
apparently, they didn't because, otherwise, he would have
been easily able to tell you what she got.

MR. PERRONI: Yes.

THE COURT: You are asking about 16 years ago so nobody knows. The answer is nobody knows, except, by the way, Ms. Finstad. Did you depose her?

MR. PERRONI: Oh, no, I could not find her, but I did this. I asked him if he had talked to her, and he said, yes, he talked to her in 2016. And I asked him, "Well, what did you talk about?" And they told him not to answer.

THE COURT: Well --

MR. PERRONI: Now, I think you can hold all of that against them, Your Honor. They had access to Suzanne Finstad. They could have gotten an affidavit from her or a declaration from her about what she has got. Instead,

they Hernandez, who had testified under oath that he didn't even know she was one of the authors that got access, do a declaration and say exactly what she got.

My point of all this is, Your Honor, is that I don't have to prove waiver by direct evidence. That is, somebody saying, "Oh, I gave a document to so and so." I can prove it by circumstantial evidence --

THE COURT: Sure, you could.

MR. PERRONI: -- and the circumstances surrounding this show that Finstad and Cashner were given access to the '81 files, and they -- they have the burden of showing that it wasn't all of the file, not me.

THE COURT: Why didn't you ask Hernandez, "You spoke to Finstad. What is her contact information? Give me her address, her phone number so I can talk to her."

MR. PERRONI: They wouldn't let me have any information.

THE COURT: Did you ask that question?

MR. PERRONI: I asked her what she talked about. They said you are not going to answer it.

THE COURT: Yeah. Well, I do think that you should have been able to ask that question, what you talked to her about. She's not -- there is no privilege there.

MR. PERRONI: I know there is no privilege there. That's one of the things I was arguing about. That's why I think it's so unfair. They have a man testify under oath in the deposition that he has no clue whether she was even one of the people who get it, then they turn around in a

declaration that I can't cross-examine or examine any more and say, well, this is what she was given.

THE COURT: His declaration -- his declaration is pretty vague. That's my point. He doesn't really say because he does not know what Ms. Finstad got.

MR. PERRONI: It is vague, Judge, but here is the point. I think that, under the law, I have made a prima facie case because they have admitted that they disclosed these files to these two people. What is left in that file, I don't know, but I've asked this Court to look at it in camera.

THE COURT: Well, what would be the point of looking at it in camera? That is, they are not withholding it based on it being a file document. They are withholding it based on it being an investigative report.

MR. PERRONI: Well, Judge, and I'm saying that under the undisputed facts in this case in 1981 it was definitely not. And what I am saying is is that --

THE COURT: I don't agree with that. So you are arguing waiver. Well, what about -- Mr. Perroni's argument is that the Sheriff's Department has admitted that various authors received access to portions of the 1981 file. I'm reading page 6 of the Hernandez declaration. Detective Hernandez apparently does not know exactly what each author was given access to.

Paragraph 7 says, "I was able to determine that the persons who were provided access were provided access to the following items," and then he lists them.

Mr. Perroni says, essentially, how does he know that. How does he know what documents that Finstad and Cashner had access to because he sure couldn't tell me.

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That is your argument, right, Mr. Perroni? MR. PERRONI: Yes, sir.

THE COURT: So what about that? How does he know?

MR. BARER: Your Honor, in doing these declarations, we dealt with Detective Hernandez. He was able to determine after investigation, he is a detective, into the files that portions of the files had been given to various persons. He didn't know exactly what was given to Suzanne Finstad or Sam Cashner, but he said these are the documents that have been given to people. And there were about 241 pages that are listed in paragraph 7. And once we found that out, we gave them to Mr. Perroni.

THE COURT: Well, how did he know that these are the documents that have been given to people?

MR. BARER: By reviewing the files and doing investigation within the firm --

THE COURT: There must be something that he saw or did that told him in paragraph 7 these are the only documents, we don't know -- apparently, he does not know what Finstad got, what Cashner got, but these are the documents that have been disclosed. Right? There must be some basis.

MR. BARER: Yes.

THE COURT: Mr. Perroni, if you want to depose

Mr. Hernandez again and ask him what his basis is for paragraph 7, you may do so. Next issue.

MR. PERRONI: Thank you. I'll do it.

THE COURT: Okay. Next issue. What else you got?

MR. PERRONI: All right. Let's see if I can go a little further here, Judge. Just so -- may I do a little bit of housekeeping for one second on what you just permitted me to do.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. PERRONI: Now, last time I took a deposition of Detective Hernandez they instructed him not to answer almost a hundred times.

THE COURT: Yeah, you can't do that in California. I don't know about in Arkansas, but you can't do that in California unless you are instructing the witness based on privilege. If there is any other ground besides privilege, you cannot instruct them not to answer.

MR. PERRONI: Well, but puking out privilege is easy to do. All you've got to do is say "I object on the basis of privilege."

THE COURT: Okay. Do you want to depose him in the court house? You can do it in the court house if you want.

MR. PERRONI: What I'm trying to is get guidelines. Can I ask him about this Suzanne Finstad fax?

THE COURT: Yeah. You already have. You can't

ask -- you can't replow the same ground, but you are

certainly entitled -- I'm giving you -- not certainly. I am giving you the right -- he says in paragraph 6 that, "We disclose to Finstad and Cashner." Then paragraph 7 he says, "Here is what we disclosed."

You are entitled to ask him, "How do you know what was disclosed? What document or interviews or communications did you have on which you are relying to say these things were disclosed and these are the only things that were disclosed?" You may ask that.

You may also ask, "Are you able to tell in paragraph 7 which ones were given to Finstad and which ones were given to Cashner or this other fellow Rulli?" That's the scope of what you get to ask so far.

MR. PERRONI: Thank you. That's good enough.

Now I'd like to address these photographs.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. PERRONI: All right. Here is what we're dealing with. In this particular case we're dealing with, apparently, three sets or types of photographs. We're dealing with photographs -- or two types. We're dealing with photographs that the Sheriff's Department took at the scene that are still in their file, and we're dealing with photographs that the Coroner's office took, presumably, because I haven't been told and they didn't submit anything to this Court to determine this, supposedly, I guess at the autopsy. I don't know.

But, here is the thing. Here is what this statute says. This statute says -- and they have to prove

this, Judge. This statute says that these photographs have to be taken by or for the Coroner at the scene of death or in the course of a postmortem examination or autopsy.

THE COURT: Right.

MR. PERRONI: Now, there is absolutely zero evidence offered by them that the photographs that are in the Sheriff Department file were taken by the Sheriff Department for the Coroner.

THE COURT: I didn't say they were.

MR. PERRONI: Okay. If they didn't say they were, then, this statute doesn't fit this section 12 --

THE COURT: Doesn't protect Sheriff's photographs, no, but it protects the Coroner's photographs.

MR. PERRONI: Okay. So we got that down. All right. So but in your tentative ruling it appears as though that it says that this statute protects all photographs.

THE COURT: No. Look at the first line on page 10 of my tentative.

MR. PERRONI: Okay.

THE COURT: Go ahead. Look at the first line on page 10 of my tentative under section 3, "The photographs are separately protected." First line.

MR. PERRONI: Let's see here. The one under photograph. Can you tell me what page that is, Judge?

"The Coroner's photographs of Natalie Wood's body are

28 separately protected by statute."

THE COURT:

Ten. First line under the heading.

MR. PERRONI: Then I misspoke. So let's deal 1 with the photographs taken by the Sheriff at the scene. 2 3 THE COURT: They are investigative records. They are protected by investigative 4 MR. PERRONI: 5 records. That's what you are saying. 6 THE COURT: Yes. 7 MR. PERRONI: Based on the evidence that's in 8 this record? THE COURT: Yes. 9 MR. PERRONI: All right. And in that connection, 10 you have declined my request for in camera inspection of 11 those? 12 I don't know what the purpose of in 13 THE COURT: 14 camera inspection would be here. That is, it's undisputed what these things are. So if I were to look at a 15 16 photograph taken by the Sheriff of Natalie Wood's body, all 17 I would see is a photograph of Natalie Wood's body taken by the Sheriff, which I have concluded that those photographs 18 19 are necessarily investigative records. I don't need to 20 look at the photograph in camera to know that. 21 MR. PERRONI: Okay. So then you are denying it. 22 THE COURT: I am denying it because the issue in 23

this case is waiver, and I can't tell waiver by looking at the records in camera.

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MR. PERRONI: All right. And but I'm also asking you to look at them in connection with this investigative exemption, which I don't believe is applicable.

THE COURT: Right. If they were relying on the

investigative file exemption, then I would have to look in camera to see if all of the records in the file were somehow protected, but they are relying on investigative record exemption. You are asking for witness interviews and photographs. I cannot think of anything that is more investigative record in nature than witness interviews and photographs of the alleged victim.

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MR. PERRONI: All right. And just for the record, just so you know, I think that that is an -- an overexpansion of section 6254(f) and an overexpansion of the ruling in Haney because that's what this Court has got to be relying on to say that.

THE COURT: Okay. My answer to you is that's a court of appeal issue.

MR. PERRONI: Okay. But I want to make sure I have a record. I've asked you to look in camera at the 1981 file records that have not been given to me. I've asked that.

THE COURT: For what reason?

MR. PERRONI: For the same reason. I believe it's not applicable, Judge.

THE COURT: What --

MR. PERRONI: I believe that section 6254(f) is not applicable.

THE COURT: Okay. Let me ask opposing counsel.

Is there any reason for me to look at anything in camera?

MR. BARER: Your Honor, the investigative

records -- and we provided Detective Hernandez's declaration they are investigative records and that are sought in the L.A. Sheriff's Department records. There is no reason to look at them in camera unless he makes a prima facie showing that they have been wrongly withheld --

THE COURT: In other words, that they are not investigative records.

MR. BARER: Right.

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THE COURT: That they are newspaper articles or something like that, which I would have to do if you were relying on investigative file exception.

MR. BARER: Exactly.

THE COURT: But there is no reason for me to look at a witness interview and say, oh, yes, this is investigative record.

MR. BARER: In fact, there were newspaper articles, magazine articles, and "48 Hours" recording we offered to Mr. Perroni. We concluded the investigative file exception does not apply and they were not investigatory records. We gave Mr. Perroni the "48 Hours" episodes. He didn't want the articles.

MR. PERRONI: No offense to opposing counsel, I have read no law that says that I have to except what the respondents are saying with respect to what is covered and what is not covered.

THE COURT: Look, I agree with you, you don't.

If there was any issue that what they are withholding is

not -- but you are specifically asking for photographs and

witness interview summaries and yacht examinations and the Miller report. All of those, by definition, are investigatory records.

So there is no point in me looking at the very things you have asked for. If you had asked for something else that might not be an investigatory record, that would be different, which is why I am saying they have to -- the Coroner has to say anything they are withholding, what is it. Is it investigatory record.

Now, if you want me to look at that and if you want me to look at the records the Coroner is withholding, I may do that.

MR. PERRONI: I understand, Judge. But here's the state of the record. The state of the record is that in 2000 and 2001 they allowed two authors to rummage through those files.

THE COURT: Did they?

MR. PERRONI: Okay.

THE COURT: Did they? I'm not aware that the authors were given the files to rummage through. I am aware that they were given documents from the file.

MR. PERRONI: No. They were given access to the file.

THE COURT: If they were given the file to look through, the whole file is disclosable.

MR. PERRONI: That is exactly what I have been trying to say. And if you look at the declaration of Hernandez, he says "access."

THE COURT: Doesn't mean "rummage." Doesn't mean they got to look at the file, that they got to know what is in the file. It does not mean that. MR. PERRONI: All right. Let's just take this proposition. Let's just take the state of the record that in 2000, 2001, that they allowed two authors to look at something. We could all agree to that. THE COURT: Yes. MR. PERRONI: All right. THE COURT: I can't remember if it was the Sheriff who did that. MR. PERRONI: Now they are coming back and saying, well, in 1981, there is other things in the file. We don't want you to have those because those are protected by the investigatory exemption they are claiming. THE COURT: Right. MR. PERRONI: Right. THE COURT: Right. MR. PERRONI: Okay. Here is what I think. think this. I think I've established a prima facie case when they admit that they have allowed the public to look at these files and they --THE COURT: You would have --MR. PERRONI: -- can't tell us what. THE COURT: You would have to show that. I don't

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THE COURT: You would have to show that. I don't believe you have shown that. Finstad or Cashner get to rummage through the file.

MR. BARER: No, Your Honor. Paragraph 6 says

portions of the 1981 files. Detective Hernandez's paragraph 6. And paragraph 7 of that declaration says these are the portions they were given.

THE COURT: Yeah, it's provided access. I cannot draw any conclusion other than that somebody went through the file at the Sheriff's Department and decided to give these people certain documents. Why they did so, I don't know. Whether Finstad was buddies with the Sheriff. I don't know why they decided to cough up this information. They didn't have to cough up any of it, as near as I can tell. But they did, and those are public.

MR. PERRONI: Well, in their Request for Admission they admitted that they gave access to Sam Cashner and Suzanne Finstad. Access.

THE COURT: Right.

MR. PERRONI: Okay. It's in the record.

THE COURT: You can ask Hernandez in your followup deposition if "access" means --

MR. PERRONI: See, Judge, that's why it's so unfair that they admit --

THE COURT: It's not. I'm giving you a followup deposition.

MR. PERRONI: Yes, Judge, it is because they admit they gave them access, then they turn around and try to convince you, well, it was only these little items right here.

THE COURT: "Access" does not mean "rummaging."

No matter what inference you want to draw, it does not mean

1 that. MR. PERRONI: I think "giving access" is arguably 2 3 "rummaging." THE COURT: "Access to portions of the file" does 4 5 not mean "rummaging." MR. PERRONI: Okay. Well, I am -- all I'm 6 7 trying -- for the record, are you denying my request to 8 look at the balance of the 1981 file to determine whether or not they fit within the investigatory exemption that the 9 respondents are claiming in this case? 10 11 THE COURT: Is there something you want me to look at? 12 13 MR. PERRONI: I want you to look at the balance 14 of the 1981 files that have not been given to me that they 15 are claiming fall within this exemption. I want you to look at them --16 17 THE COURT: You mean you want me to decide whether these are investigatory records? 18 19 MR. PERRONI: Because --20 THE COURT: If that's what you want me to do? have concluded, and you are not going to move me off the 21 point, that an investigatory record is exempt. Are you 22 23 asking me to review what has been withheld to determine 24 that it is or is not an investigatory record? MR. PERRONI: Yes. 25 26 THE COURT: All right. Bring it in. I'll have 2.7 to look at the file and see if it's an investigatory record. 28

MR. PERRONI: And the reason why I am asking you, not to burden you with this, is because I don't believe them. With all due respect to opposing counsel, with the information that's been given to me, I don't believe these people. I'll believe you, but I won't believe them.

THE COURT: Well, it's nice to be believed.

Okay. What else? So let's back -- let me summarize so far. You get to depose Hernandez on paragraph -- what is it, 6 and 7 -- yes, of his declaration. And you get to -- now you get to ask Hernandez what he means by "access."

Okay.

MR. PERRONI: Right.

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THE COURT: Okay. I'll look at -- it's the 1981 file you want me to look at; right?

MR. PERRONI: Right, the balance.

THE COURT: The undisclosed portion to see-- I'm only going to be looking at one thing, are they investigatory records. For example, I would assume that a telephone message is not an investigatory record. Am I right? Is that why it was disclosed?

MR. BARER: Your Honor, it was disclosed because it had been disclosed to people, members of the public so we have to give -- It's waived.

THE COURT: I doubt a phone message from Suzanne Finstad is an investigatory record. Maybe if it was a phone message from Robert Wagner, it would be. I don't know whether that would be an investigatory record. I don't know.

 $$\operatorname{MR.\ PERRONI:}$$ That's the point. That's all I'm getting at.

THE COURT: Okay. What else?

MR. PERRONI: May I -- I don't have anything

further. I do have some procedural questions.

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THE COURT: Okay. We got the Miller report hanging over their heads. So go ahead.

MR. BARER: Your Honor --

THE COURT: Wait. Before you do that, do you have any problem with the Coroner having to explain what they are relying on for withholding the rest of the microfilm information?

MR. BARER: No, Your Honor. We submit on that portion of the tentative.

THE COURT: Okay. Fine.

MR. BARER: Your Honor, should I address the Miller Report? I would also like to address the Hernandez deposition ruling, if I may.

THE COURT: Well, let's address Miller. That's the one I was interested in when we started this hearing.

MR. BARER: Certainly, Your Honor.

Your Honor made a finding in the tentative that he, not only did Dr. Noguchi not only use the Miller report, but possessed it. So the question is whether the evidence preponderates that he possessed it, considering that, as Your Honor pointed out in both the written and oral tentative, Dr. Noguchi testified that he didn't take anything with him when he left office, and he doesn't have

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anything now. Plus, at page --
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               THE COURT: That's what he said.
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               MR. BARER: Plus at pages 318 to 319 of the
    Appendix, he was asked by Mr. Perroni did he have access to
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    the Miller document when he wrote the book, and he said he
    didn't know. So that's a neutral point on the evidence.
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    So we got two indications that he didn't take it with him.
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    He does not have it. He does not know at this point.
                    What evidence is there that he had it.
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    There's the passage in the book, "Rereading the report now,
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    I can see the Isthmus Bay in my mind's eye."
               THE COURT:
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                           Yes.
              MR. BARER: First of all, the statement in a
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    book, "rereading the report today," to say that he was
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    rereading the report when was writing that is hearsay.
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    It's introduced to prove the truth of the matter asserted.
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               THE COURT: It's a prior inconsistent statement,
    is it not?
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               MR. BARER:
                           It's a prior inconsistent -- prior
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    inconsistent with taking it with him?
               THE COURT: With the statement that he didn't
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    take anything with him, is it a prior inconsistent
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    statement?
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               MR. BARER:
                           I'm not sure if it even qualifies as
                                           I'm not sure if he
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    that, considering he had a coauthor.
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    wrote that particular segment.
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               THE COURT: I think he's saddled every word.
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Whether he had a coauthor or not, he's saddled with every

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word in the book as his own. It's inconsistent with his
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    statement that he didn't take anything with him.
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                    Now, you can argue he didn't take anything
    with him, but he was given access when he wrote his memoirs
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    so it's not inconsistent. That requires an explanation.
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    On its face, it's inconsistent.
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                    You know, then we have this 2002 interview.
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    Not interview, memorandum.
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               MR. BARER: The 2012 reopening the investigation?
               THE COURT:
                          Yes. I'm sorry. Yes. What page is
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    that?
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                          That's attached to the --
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              MR. BARER:
                          361, is that it?
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               THE COURT:
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              MR. BARER:
                          It's attached to the petition.
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    And --
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               THE COURT:
                          It's in Mr. Perroni's Appendix.
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              MR. BARER: Yes.
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              MS. BIRENBAUM: I've got it at App 79.
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              MR. BARER:
                           Page 79 of the Appendix.
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               THE COURT: What do we have there? We have
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    Dr. Noguchi present with Mr. Miller. It doesn't say
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    Dr. Noguchi was given a copy. It says a copy was given to
    both L.A.S.D. and Mr. Miller.
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24
              MR. BARER:
                           Yes.
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               THE COURT: Now, I don't know how Mr. Miller
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    could be given a copy without Dr. Noguchi also having a
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    copy. That's what they are talking about.
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Now, here is where Mr. Perroni, I think, is

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entitled to an inference. The inference is Noguchi had a copy at this meeting, whether he's looking over Miller's shoulders or not does not really matter. It doesn't say that they have left the meeting with their own copies, but -- well, leave it there.

MR. BARER: Well, of course, this is unconnected with the writing of the book "Coroner" because "Coroner" was published in 1983. This is in 2012.

THE COURT: Right. I understand.

MR. BARER: The context in which Dr. Noguchi and Mr. Miller were present here was a reevaluation of the case with the Sheriff's Department and the Coroner acting together.

THE COURT: Right.

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MR. BARER: In terms of cases that are investigated where somebody Commissioned a report or read a record who then leaves public service, I would submit that the purposes of investigative exemption as put forth in Haney are furthered by being able to call in former coroners, people would did investigations for them, to be involved in reopened or reevaluated law enforcement investigations to ask them, you wrote this, what did you mean by it, or, you wrote it, can I ask you a few questions about it.

THE COURT: Right. I don't disagree with that, which is why I said I don't need to decide whether giving the document to Miller was a waiver, and I said probably not. And I said probably not for the very reason you are

arguing, which is, okay, he's an agent of the Coroner when he wrote it. Even though he is an unpaid volunteer agent, he's still an agent of the Coroner. He created a report. It's the -- what does the Coroner call that, investigative narrative.

And then when he's called back in 15 years later, whatever it is, they say, you know, you wrote this report, let me refresh your memory, take look at it, what did you mean by this, what did you mean by that, I tend to think that it may be covered.

So my point was not so much that Miller was given access in this May 20th, 2012, meeting, but that Noguchi was there. And he is -- it does not say anything about him having or not having his own copy of the report.

But here is where I think, you know, the circumstantial evidence on which Mr. Perroni wants to rely starts to add up. Noguchi has said in his book, "Rereading the report, I see the Isthmus Bay." I've been there many times. I've never seen the Isthmus look like this description. That's just my personal aside. I can't remember what he says.

But so he said when he wrote his memoirs he's rereading the report. Then in 2012 he's there at least when the report is given to Miller, and they are certainly talking about the report. And he's a public employee and Miller -- I'm sorry. He's a former public employee -- and Miller never was a public employee. He was probably an agent of the Coroner's office.

And maybe if all they did was show it to the two of them and retrieve it from them after asking them about it, maybe any privilege -- not privilege, any exemption would still apply. I tend to agree that it would. But it doesn't say we took the report back from them. It doesn't say we treated it as confidential. It doesn't say that at all. It says it was given to Miller. In fact, as near as I can tell, the inference would be that Miller walked away from the meeting with a copy of his own report.

Now, under those circumstances, if Miller didn't retain his -- you know, people who write things tend to keep it on their computers or wherever, handwritten copy. If he didn't keep a copy in his files, which apparently he didn't because they wouldn't have to give him a copy, if they let him walk out of the meeting with a copy of his own report, I think that's a waiver.

I think that's a waiver.

So there is an inference here. Mr. Perroni is arguing circumstantial evidence, and I -- and you didn't rebut it. You could have presented evidence. 2012 isn't that long ago. We could have had evidence from the author of this report that says, oh, no, we did not give them a copy of the Miller report to take out of the meeting. We retrieved them from them as they left. I don't have that declaration.

MR. BARER: Well, doesn't say they took them with them, and the evidence is that Dr. Noguchi doesn't have it.

He testified to that. And there is no statement from Mr. Miller that he has it or so the inference that they walked away from this meeting with this report that Dr. Noguchi filed away without releasing I would submit is not supported by the record or any sworn evidence.

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THE COURT: You know, the statement by the Sheriff that a copy was given to both L.A.S.D. and Mr. Miller. Doesn't say we retrieved it, we gave them a copy. I think the inference is he walked out of the meeting with his copy of his own report.

MR. BARER: I would not say that unless there is something in this fairly comprehensive report by the Dr. Lachmanian that he left with the report, and there isn't.

THE COURT: Yeah. I mean, I -- you know, the interesting thing here is -- at least I found this interesting, that the investigative reports are protected and the Coroner's investigation is all protected, and yet Dr. Noguchi gets to pick and choose what he's going to disclose. Of course, once it's disclosed, it's disclosed forever, but he gets to decide what he's going to disclose. There is no criteria for that. It's just whatever he feels like disclosing. I found that to be an interesting fact.

I think that's what the law is. I think he gets to decide. I think the Sheriff gets to decide what they are going to disclose if it is otherwise exempt. And nobody -- I guess they could be criticized for either being over-inclusive or under-inclusive. Other than being criticized, they are perfectly within their legal right in

doing that. I mean, I found that interesting, but that's kind of an aside.

So the Miller -- you know, the Miller report hangs on, you know -- I don't know, it hangs on a fairly slim reed. But, you know, we have the fact that Noguchi debated whether or not to cough up the Miller report in the first place and decided against it. Now, here we are 35 years later. It's definitely been used by him in writing his memoirs. He claims he was rereading it. It was definitely given to Miller at the 2012 meeting. I have no evidence that it was taken back.

And -- in the meeting, I tend to think it's protected, but if Miller left the meeting with a copy of the report given to him by the Coroner's office, I do not think it's protected. And I have no reason to believe that he didn't walk out of the meeting with a copy of his own report. So I think it's -- the waiver rule applies.

You wanted to ask -- comment about the deposition?

MR. BARER: Certainly, Your Honor. First an argument, then a housekeeping question in case I lose on the argument. The argument is that we filed our brief and served it July 28th, 2016. That was almost two months now because of continuances two months before this trial. Their discovery was still open. Was still the right to make motions to compel further discovery. In fact, Mr. Perroni made a motion to compel further discovery and, specifically, a further deposition of Detective Hernandez.

That was denied.

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He has made this argument about due process and the right to cross-examine Detective Hernandez a few days ago. Why didn't he make a motion when there was still time to make a timely discovery motion and move for -- to compel the deposition of Detective Hernandez then, instead of now when we're done with briefing, we're at trial, and the production of more evidence, I would assume, would lead to supplemental briefing at another hearing.

THE COURT: I don't know about supplemental briefing. I think there's an answer to that. This is something I wanted to explain to Mr. Perroni. CPRA cases by definition are supposed to be expeditiously done. are narrow in scope. Discovery, in my view -- the Supreme Court is going to decide this issue -- discovery is limited. They are not only decided expeditiously, supposedly, by the trial court, they are reviewable only by mandamus in the court of appeal. And all of this is because CPRA cases do not involve the same type of legal rights as a civil action for damages or declaratory relief between opposing parties. It is an access to public records case, which is limited.

Now -- and to answer your question, I mean, I do quite a few of these now. It is often the case where we get to trial in a CPRA case and one side, typically the petitioner, says, well, they said in their declaration something that I would like to test its accuracy. If it is within the scope of a CPRA case, typically, that is we

looked here, we looked there, we looked high, we looked low, we could not find anything. And the petitioner said, "Well, I don't -- I don't trust them. I don't believe that. I would like to test that." I sometimes let them do that.

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Here, we have not a "I want to test the search" statement by Mr. Perroni, but, rather, "I want to test what he said about -- relative to waiver because, in my view, it's not something consistent with what he said at his deposition." Well, if Hernandez had provided no declaration, I would not be permitting him to reopen discovery. This is an issue of evidence presented in the opposition for trial.

Your argument is when the opposition was filed he still could have taken discovery. And, okay, but I don't think he has waived his right to argue to me in a very limited and narrow way, I don't expect this to be an expansive deposition, but on the two things I said he could ask about, to receive his assurance due process or otherwise that Mr. Hernandez's statements in his declaration are accurate, you know, I am exercising my discretion to permit that.

MR. BARER: That raises a housekeeping question that, once Mr. Perroni has taken Detective Hernandez's deposition and has his testimony, what is he to do with it? Are we going to have a further hearing in which it's submitted?

THE COURT: You are, because he wants me to look

in camera at -- whose file, Mr. Perroni, the Sheriff's file or the Coroner's file?

MR. PERRONI: Well, okay, let me see if I can answer you this way. I thought in this tentative decision that you are ordering them to tell you in Winters' declaration where in the world that he has come up with this confidentiality on the remaining items in the file.

THE COURT: I am.

MR. PERRONI: Okay. Well, I am fine with that.

I want to see it. Okay. So now we're talking about

Sheriff's file. To answer your question, we would just be talking about the Sheriff's file right now.

THE COURT: Okay. So housekeeping, you take your deposition of Hernandez on the two issues I said you can do. You come back for the in camera hearing where I look at the Sheriff's file only to decide whether they are investigative records. In addition to that, the Coroner's office presents a declaration that says what exemption they are relying on for the remaining microfilm records that have been withheld.

Does that take care of everything except setting a date for that appearance?

MR. BARER: So no further briefing, but we will be submitting, A, the declaration; and, B, the records of the 1981 L.A.S.D. investigation to be reviewed in camera. And Mr. Perroni, by whatever deadline the Court sets, will submit any further deposition testimony from a transcript from Detective Hernandez.

THE COURT: Yeah. You will have to bring the Custodian of Records for the in camera review, the Sheriff's Custodian of Records.

MR. PERRONI: Judge --

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THE COURT: Because I will be asking the custodian, you know, what have you brought me and where is it from to be sure that I have everything that I'm supposed to have. And that happens in chambers under oath without Mr. Perroni present.

MR. PERRONI: Judge, point of order here on this Coroner's -- remaining Coroner stuff.

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. PERRONI: They give some kind of declaration or something about the remaining things in that file. Based on what they say, I may ask this Court to look at that information, too, to determine whether or not it's what they say.

THE COURT: Well, there isn't going to be another hearing so if you want to see that declaration and make that decision, then that has to happen sometime before the next hearing.

MR. PERRONI: Okay. So what I would like for you to do is set some dates.

THE COURT: All right.

MR. PERRONI: What is this -- may I ask you this. What is an OSC re judgment? What is that?

THE COURT: An order to show cause.

MR. PERRONI: Order to show cause. OSC. Sorry.

Well, if we could -- Your Honor, I have to fly from Arkansas here. So --

THE COURT: Well, how long will it take you to complete your deposition?

MR. PERRONI: Well, based on what you've said that I could ask, it shouldn't take me very long at all.

THE COURT: I don't mean how long will the deposition be. How long will it take you to fly back out here and complete the deposition? How long do you want for that?

MR. PERRONI: Well, what I'm trying to do is coordinate it with any other appearances. If I'm supposed to be back here October 20th, perhaps we can coordinate it to where when I fly back the next time, we can do this deposition, and I could get an expedited transcript. It shouldn't be too long. And then they could also get the declaration from the Coroner's office, and we can address all this at that time.

THE COURT: Well, how long before the hearing do you want the deposition, then?

MR. PERRONI: Well, I guess what I'm saying is if I could do the deposition the day before the hearing.

THE COURT: I don't know. Is that workable?

MS. BIRENBAUM: Well, my instinct is the Custodian of Records is most likely Detective Hernandez. That's asking an on duty sheriff to take two days, one day for the deposition and the next day to be in court away from other duties. I can certainly check with him --

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THE COURT: There are lots of deputy sheriffs.
What are you saying, they are going to have a need for him?
There are a lot of deputy sheriffs in the Sheriff's
Department.
          MR. BARER: He is a homicide detective, Your
Honor. There is not as many homicide detectives as deputy
sheriffs.
          THE COURT: I don't know how many there are, but
homicides are up this year. Whatever you can work out.
What are you -- I'm going to set a date for the hearing and
a date for the declaration of the Coroner's office.
about a week from today for the declaration from the
Coroner's office? Is that fine?
          MS. BIRENBAUM: I am in court the rest of the
week.
          MR. BARER: Could we get more time for that, Your
Honor.
          THE COURT:
                     All right. How much time do you
want?
         MS. BIRENBAUM: I could probably get it by next
Friday. Monday is a holiday for me.
          THE COURT: Next Friday, the 7th?
          MS. BIRENBAUM: It's cutting so close for me.
          THE COURT: That's 10 days.
          MS. BIRENBAUM: I know.
          THE COURT: Yeah. Let's do the 7th.
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Declaration -- you don't need to file it with me. Provide

it to Mr. Perroni by the 7th. And then he will decide

based on that whether he wants the Coroner's custodian to be present at the hearing for the same purpose that the Sheriff's custodian will be present. And all -- so there wasn't anything magic about October 20th. If you need more time from the 7th to prepare -- why don't I move it to November 10th at 9:30 for the continued hearing on the writ at which I will at a minimum do in camera examination.

Now, as to when the Hernandez additional deposition occurs, I'm going to leave that up to you to see if you can work it out.

Okay. Does that take care of everything?

MR. PERRONI: Except for this. The tentative

decision says I'm supposed to prepare something -
THE COURT: I mean, you can't prepare a judgment

until the case is over. The case isn't over until November

10th. The hearing is continued until November 10th.

MR. PERRONI: All right. That's good.

THE COURT: Nothing to prepare judgment-wise right now.

MR. PERRONI: Right. Thanks a lot.

MR. BARER: Only remaining issue, Your Honor, is Mr. Perroni sounds like is prevailing, at least in part, so he's going to be entitled to costs under 6259(d), but there was an issue about whether he was entitled to attorney fees. We cited law that said he isn't. He says he is and hasn't cited any law saying he is.

THE COURT: Attorneys fees motions are customarily made post judgment. They are not required to

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be made at the trial on the merits. So I am not going to
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    worry about that right now is what I'm saying. The Rules
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    of Court, Mr. Perroni, tell you when you have to make your
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    motion for attorneys fees.
               MR. PERRONI: Thank you.
                                          I will.
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               THE COURT: Okay. So the only thing -- I've made
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    some orders and continued the hearing. You want to waive
    notice?
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               MR. PERRONI: Yes, sir.
                          Notice is waived, Your Honor.
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               MR. BARER:
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               THE COURT:
                           Okay. Thank you.
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                    (Proceeding adjourned at 3:45 p.m.)
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SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES

DEPARTMENT 85 HON. JAMES C. CHALFANT, JUDGE

SAMUEL A. PERRONI,)

PETITIONER,

vs.) NO. BS159430

) REPORTER'S

MARK A. FAJARDO ET AL.,) CERTIFICATE

RESPONDENT.)

I, Buford J. James, CSR 9296, Official Reporter of the Superior Court of the State of California, for the County of Los Angeles, do hereby certify that the foregoing pages 1 through 54, inclusive, comprise a full, true, and correct transcript of the testimony and proceedings held in the above-entitled matter on TUESDAY, SEPTEMBER 27, 2016.

Dated this 2nd day of NOVEMBER, 2016.

Buford J. James, Certified Shorthand Reporter